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THE RISE OF MODERN HUMANITARIANISM

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The coexistence in human nature of the traits which are ordinarily called humanity and cruelty appears to be a strange anomaly. This anomaly manifests itself in many different forms in individual cases and at different times and places. The savage may display the most inexorable cruelty toward all human beings not belonging to his own small social group and yet show the tenderest regard for his offspring. The criminal may murder his victim in cold blood and yet devote a loving care to an animal pet. The peoples of modern civilized nations are displaying much concern over the welfare of the poor and yet with the utmost readiness rush into wars with each other which cause untold suffering and loss of life.

This apparent anomaly can be explained only on the basis of the evolution of human nature in general. In the course of this evolution there have developed certain characteristics which seem incompatible with each other. Thus there are, on the one hand, certain traits which promote the preservation of the individual. These include the aggressive tendencies which aid the individual in defending himself and impel him to prey upon others. By some psychologists these aggressive tendencies are grouped under the head of the instinct of pugnacity or the combative instinct, and the affective state which ordinarily accompanies it is the emotion of anger. Furthermore, the sexual and the parental instincts may impel the individual to commit aggressive acts toward those who attempt to thwart his desires.

On the other hand, certain other traits impel the individual to perform acts which promote the welfare of the species. Thus the sexual and parental instincts and their accompanying states of feeling impel the individual to do things for the persons toward whom those instincts are directed and in these acts we find the germs of altruism. It is believed by many that there are also

social instincts which impel individuals to do things for their fellows apart from the sexual and parental relationships. It is doubtful if there is any distinct social instinct, but a number of traits make man social.

We have not the space here to describe and analyze in detail the numerous instincts and feelings which play a part in giving rise to humanity and to cruelty, or to analyze the complex forms in which these traits become combined with each other.¹ Nor can we discuss the indirect and therefore unexpected and sometimes abnormal ways in which these traits lead sometimes to humanity and sometimes to cruelty.² But it is evident that these traits are fundamental in human nature and will therefore always remain as permanent forces for humanity and for cruelty. We must now turn to another aspect of human nature which plays an important part in the determination of humanity and cruelty.

The intellect serves sometimes as a factor for humanity and sometimes as a factor for cruelty. The foresight which intelligence makes possible may lead the individual to do injury to others in anticipation of thereby gaining something for himself. Or it may lead him under other circumstances to perform services for others where such benevolence will probably redound to his own benefit. Furthermore, the intelligence makes possible the sympathetic imagination which enables the individual to recognize the suffering of others as a kin to the pain which he himself at times experiences. This recognition usually gives rise to a feeling of discomfort which may inhibit him from inflicting pain upon others or may destroy the callous indifference with which he would otherwise regard suffering in others and may lead him to take active measures for the relief of those in pain.³

¹ The literature of modern psychology contains an enormous amount of data with regard to the instincts and feelings. The present writer has discussed these traits at some length in his book entitled *The Science of Human Behavior, Biological and Psychological Foundations*, New York, 1913.

² For example, the sexual instinct rouses in some individuals the sadistic impulse to inflict pain upon others, while in other individuals it arouses the desire to have pain inflicted upon one's self.

³ According to some students of the subject, all humanitarianism, and indeed all morality as well, has grown out of sympathy. For an extreme form of this theory see Alexander Sutherland, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, London, 1898.

These instincts and feelings and intelligence have existed in man since the origin of the human species so that men have always displayed these tendencies toward cruelty on the one hand and toward humanity on the other hand. The historical data which we possess show that the degree and kind of humanitarianism at any time and place have depended upon many circumstances such as the physical environment, the amount and kind of knowledge possessed by the community, the prevailing moral ideas and religious beliefs, the relation of the community to other communities, and many other circumstances.

Furthermore, history seems to indicate that, as a general rule, humanitarianism has broadened its scope and has extended over a wider range as the social group has increased in size in the course of social evolution. Thus the humanity of the primitive savage was restricted entirely or almost entirely to the members of the horde or clan or small tribal group to which he belonged while all the rest of mankind were his enemies to be treated as such. But as the social group expanded in size so as to become in course of time national and to a certain extent international in its scope, the humanitarian interests of mankind extended their range in similar fashion. This is, of course, to be explained on the basis of the part played by the intelligence described above. As the group increased in size the interests of the individual coincided with an ever-increasing number of individuals, thus leading the individual to regard the interests of these individuals as his own. Furthermore, this increase in the size of the social group increased the number of individuals of whom the individual had knowledge and whom he recognized as being of the same kind as himself, thus extending greatly the range of his sympathetic imagination.

On the basis of the forces and circumstances which have been suggested can doubtless be explained all the changes which have taken place in the past in the character and extent of humanitarianism. If we had the space it would be interesting and profitable to discuss the causes of the manifestations of humanitarianism in ancient Greece and Rome, in India, in China, and at many other times and places. But it is essential that we devote some attention to the causes of the great modern humanitarian movement, for

otherwise it is impossible to understand the efforts being made to relieve and abolish poverty and its attendant evils.

We have an abundance of evidence that humanitarianism has increased greatly in its range during very recent times. We need not go back more than a century in the occidental world to find that the criminal was being treated with much greater severity than at present, that there was little general interest in the welfare of the poor aside from personal almsgiving, that human slavery still existed extensively, that the position of woman was much lower than it is at present, that there was little general interest in the welfare of animals. During the last few decades has taken place a vast amount of social legislation to improve the condition of the working class, to lessen poverty, to ameliorate the condition of the criminal, to give better care to the sick and the insane. During the same period there have been extensive private philanthropic movements directed toward the same ends. Much has been accomplished toward placing woman upon an equality with man. There has been much effort devoted to the prevention of cruelty to animals. Much has been done to regulate warfare in order to make it more humane and to lessen the suffering caused by it by means of the Red Cross. There has been an extensive movement to prevent and to abolish war altogether.

This sudden rise of humanitarianism in recent times has indeed been a remarkable phenomenon. At first sight it may be difficult to discern why it should have taken place, and various explanations for it have been offered, the principal ones of which we must consider.

It may appear as if this phenomenon was due to a sudden change in human nature which made man much more humane than he had been. This explanation has been offered by a few writers who have discussed the matter. Perhaps the ablest presentation of this view has been made by Sutherland. This writer has argued that a process of selection has taken place which since the Middle Ages has eliminated the unsympathetic types and has increased greatly the amount of sympathy in human beings. Stated in his own words his theory is as follows:

It is, I am convinced, an actual systemic change which has been the cause of the great development of sympathy in the past. A man fairly typical of

the modern standard of sympathy would rather have a hand cut off than that any person should be killed by his fault. One of our ancestors of 1,000 years [ago] would without compunction have slaughtered thirty persons to have saved his own hand. If we analyze the motives, we find that they are in no way concerned with justice or righteousness, what we have been told by others or what we have reasoned out for ourselves. Our reluctance to cause the death of another is based on certain instinctive aversions, which were much less developed among our ancestors.¹

His explanation of the causes of this change in the constitution of man is as follows:

The clever, but heartless, fellow has a less chance of ultimate success and eventual representation in posterity than one less clever but better equipped with those qualities which win friends, gain a wife's devotion, and foster a family's happy affection. So, too, with nations. If the prevailing type be crafty but selfish, the strength of a people will dissolve in distrust and disunion, simpler folks, welded by ardent patriotism, secured within by the prevalence of a sincere and unaffected friendliness, and pursuing their honest paths in multitude of homes that are full of family devotion, will have better prospect of ultimately prevailing. It may seem fantastic to assert that within historic times actual physiological differences of nerve structure can have developed in the race. Yet it is a sober fact, though demonstrable as yet by only indirect proofs.²

But this explanation is far from convincing. In the first place, adequate reasons are not given to explain why this selective process did not take place many hundreds if not thousands of years before the time when Sutherland alleges it took place. In the second place, even if we grant that it did take place at the time named, the growth of sympathy alone would hardly account for the great rise of humanitarianism for, as we have seen, various factors in addition to sympathy play a part in causing humanitarianism.

We have not the space to review all the data which are of significance with respect to this question. But they indicate that the changes in the instinctive, affective, and intellectual traits of man have been too slight during the last few centuries, and, for that matter, thousands of years, to account for so great a movement as the modern humanitarian movement. So that we must look elsewhere for an explanation of this movement.

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 4.

² *Op. cit.*, II, 4-5.

Another explanation of the modern humanitarian movement which is perhaps the most widespread is that it is due to religion and to the Christian religion in particular. The first thought that this theory naturally suggests is that religion has been in existence for several thousands of years at least and the Christian religion for nearly two thousand years, while the modern humanitarian movement dates back only a couple of centuries or so. The supporters of this theory are in the habit of at once replying to this thought that the circumstances were not suitable for Christianity to manifest its humanitarian influence until recently. But it is obvious that by saying so they are at once relinquishing most of their theory, for they are admitting that other factors were involved in the causation of the modern humanitarian movement and these factors may have been much more potent than Christianity.

When we review the historical data with respect to this question we can readily discern that Christianity has been a force both for and against humanitarianism. In this respect it has been like most if not all other religions. In the first place, it must be noted that the attitude of mind required by every religious faith is such as to make impossible the most thoroughgoing type of humanitarianism and therefore religion will always be to a certain extent a force against humanitarianism. This is because a religious faith requires an unquestioning belief in its doctrines and demands that they be set above other truths as being of a sacred character. Partly for this reason religious ideas are usually held by believers with a high degree of emotional intensity and differences of religious belief frequently serve as a serious barrier between individuals and groups because of the emotional conflict which they bring about. Now it goes without saying that other ideas as well are held with much emotional intensity by individuals and by groups, but this is peculiarly true of religious ideas because these are regarded as most important by those who believe in them. We may illustrate this point best by comparing religion with science. It is true that a scientist may hold a scientific idea with a degree of emotional intensity which equals the fervor of the religious believer. But that is an individual peculiarity and the spirit and method of science is such that no idea is held as sacred. On the contrary,

every idea however firmly established may be attacked and overthrown. Consequently the mental attitude encouraged by science is such as to permit of free intercourse without restriction between all parts of mankind, while the mental attitude not only encouraged but positively required by religion will always serve as a barrier to the highest and most extensive form of humanitarianism.

But on the other hand, most if not all religions have taught certain doctrines which have had a humanitarian influence, and this has been true of Christianity. And it goes without saying that by Christianity we mean the set of religious beliefs and practices which from time to time and from place to place have been called Christian. This historical Christianity is the only one which is of importance for the interpretation of social evolution, so that the beliefs of the person after whom this religion was named or of any other individual are of no importance for our purposes.

Christianity has probably exerted an influence for humanitarianism principally through two of its doctrines, namely, the doctrine of the sanctity of human life and the doctrine of universal brotherhood.¹ Now I hardly need to say that neither of these doctrines was original with Christianity. The doctrine of the sanctity of human life is based upon the idea that there is an immortal soul in every human being, and this idea has been held not only by many of the more advanced religions but is to be found among the religious beliefs of many primitive savages. It is indeed one of the elementary animistic beliefs. The doctrine of universal brotherhood had also been held by various individuals and religions before Christianity. But coming as a new religion into the pagan world at an opportune time, it emphasized these ideas in a fresh manner and probably was a force for humanitarianism for a time.

Unfortunately the religion had not been in existence more than two or three centuries before asceticism began to play an important part in it and has ever since remained a malignant force against humanitarianism. It has been such a force because it attempted to suppress the normal place of sex in human life; it consequently

¹ Cf. W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, New York, 1877, chap. iv.

lowered the position of woman,¹ and it has done much to destroy the joy of living for many human beings by encouraging puritanical ideas and practices.

Then the religion became highly organized in the form of a church, and for more than a thousand years the pages of its history were blackened by the incredible inhumanity of its wars, crusades, and persecutions, and by its stupid and brutal opposition to the higher forms of culture. Not even the partisans and apologists of the Christian church have been able to deny, where they have been at all fairminded, that during this dark and bloody period it was a powerful force against humanitarianism. Christianity then presented itself as a strong and militant religion at its worst, carrying its doctrines at the point of a sword. During this period it applied its doctrines of the sanctity of human life and of universal brotherhood only to Christians and not always even to them.

With the coming of the Renaissance, which was itself a reaction against Christianity, and the beginning of the modern period, the church and religion fortunately lost their dominant position in the occidental world. Since that time the humane forces in religion

¹ It goes without saying that the position of woman was none too high previous to Christianity. But there is a great deal of historical evidence to indicate that the effect of the new religion (owing largely to the teachings of St. Paul), during the first few centuries of the Christian era at any rate, was to make woman's position somewhat lower than it then was in Rome and in other parts of the ancient civilized world. This opinion is expressed by an English clergyman in the following words:

"It is a prevalent opinion that woman owes her present high position to Christianity, and the influence of the Teutonic mind. I used to believe this opinion, but in the first three centuries I have not been able to see that Christianity had any favorable effect on the position of woman, but, on the contrary, that it tended to lower her character and contract the range of her activity" (Principal J. Donaldson, "The Position of Woman among the Early Christians," *Contemporary Review*, September, 1889, p. 433).

An eminent sociologist explains the outburst of asceticism which led to this lowering of woman's position in the following words:

"During the first four centuries Christians believed that the world was about to perish. Evidently this belief affected the whole philosophy of life. Marriage lost sense and the procreation of children lost interest. This may be seen in I Cor., chap. 7. It also helps to explain the outburst of asceticism and extravagant behavior, such as the renunciation of conjugal intimacy by married people" (W. G. Sumner, "The Family and Social Change," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1909, p. 585).

If Christianity has helped woman at all during the last few centuries it has been only through the general influence of the religion upon the humanitarian movement and not through any partiality of this religion for woman.

have had more of a chance to exert some influence, though the Christian opposition to humanitarianism still retains more or less strength. But these humane forces within the religion were quite incompetent to cause the great modern humanitarian movement.

Still another theory as to the causes of the modern humanitarian movement which has been held by a few has been that certain moral ideas came into existence and attained currency and this movement followed as a consequence. It is obvious that this theory is similar to the religious theory we have just discussed and that much the same objections may be made to it. In the first place, it is evident that these moral ideas are not at all new. It is only necessary to mention such names as those of Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch, and Epictetus to indicate that these ideas were known to the ancient world. And yet they did not give rise to a humanitarian movement at that time. In modern times, notably in the eighteenth century, these ideas reappeared in the form of a system of humanitarian ethics and had a great deal of influence. But apparently the circumstances had changed, and other forces were at work for humanitarianism, so that it is hardly accurate to attribute this movement to these ideas.

Let us now turn to the true causes of this movement. These causes may be readily discerned if we consider the salient features of modern history which are familiar to all. The modern period began with the Renaissance with its revival of the classic culture of ancient Greece and Rome and its renascence of art and learning. This renascence of learning marked the beginning of the development of modern science which made possible the great economic changes of modern times. At the same time were being carried on extended explorations to all parts of the world which resulted in the discovery of the Western Hemisphere and in a great extension of commercial relations. These explorations also resulted in the colonizing of many parts of the world by Europeans.

In the eighteenth century began the great industrial revolution which substituted machine and factory methods of production on a large scale for the hand and domestic methods of production on a small scale of the past. This great change meant a vast extension of the principle of the division of labor within the process of production. Furthermore, with the aid of international commerce

it meant a world-wide extension of the division of labor which increased greatly the interdependence of all parts of the world.

Along with this extension of the division of labor took place a great increase in the range, facility, and rapidity of the means of communication through the steamship, railroad, telegraph, telephone, post-office, press, etc. By these means the different parts of the world have been put in touch with each other and have come to know each other to an extent which was utterly impossible in ancient times.

Last but not least, there was taking place at the same time the development of modern science to which I have already referred and which was to a great extent the cause of the great changes above mentioned. In the nineteenth century came the theory of evolution which showed the common origin of the whole organic world, including man. When this theory was applied in anthropology it showed that just as there is no absolute distinction between man and other animals so there is no absolute distinction between the different races of men. When this theory was applied in sociology it showed the fundamental unity in the culture which has been developing in the course of social evolution.

The significance of these great changes for humanitarianism is evident when we consider them in the light of the discussion in the first part of this chapter. The increasing interdependence of the different parts of the world made it more and more evident to individuals and to social groups that it was to their interest to concern themselves with the welfare of others. Furthermore, the knowledge acquired with regard to other individuals and social groups through the means of communication described above and through science has shown the fundamental similarity of human beings and has stimulated the sympathetic imagination to a high degree. These ideas and this knowledge have naturally tended in the main to stimulate the humane feelings and impulses in the relations of men and of social groups and to inhibit the cruel feelings and impulses. Thus these fundamental human traits which have been in existence a very long time are being influenced by the intelligence, under the social conditions which have evolved during the past few centuries, in the direction of humanitarianism.

This is an example of the familiar psychological phenomenon of feelings and instinctive impulses being directed and to a certain extent controlled by ideas. It is through such combining of the different parts of the mental makeup that are formed the sentimental complexes which play so important a part in the life of man. Owing in the main to the events and conditions which have been described the prevailing sentiments of the day are humanitarian. But the same psychological process is also displayed in the opposite direction. Where individuals or groups are led to believe that their interests conflict and that they are not alike, neither self-interest nor sympathetic imagination will establish humane relations between them but their attitude toward each other will be either that of callous indifference or of hostility and hatred. It goes without saying that this situation frequently arises and will always exist to a certain extent, since the instincts and feelings out of which it arises will always persist in human nature. Thus when two classes regard their interest as conflicting and are not well acquainted with each other they will regard each other with dislike if not with hatred and are very likely to arrive at open hostility. If they are economic classes the upper class will regard the lower class as stupid and indolent, while the lower will believe that the upper is consciously exploiting it.

The same situation frequently arises between nations. Owing to ignorance of ethnological data the tendency is to exaggerate the racial differences between nations. This is well illustrated in Europe today. All the nations of Europe are very heterogeneous ethnically, and certain ethnic elements are represented in many of these countries. And yet it is the prevailing belief in each of these countries that the nation is ethnically pure or almost pure and is quite distinct from every other nation. This mistaken belief does not encourage the sympathetic imagination. Furthermore, these nations are very prone to regard their interests as conflicting, so that it is still deplorably easy for them to go to war with each other. Then when war breaks out the inhibitions upon the cruel tendencies in man disappear to a large extent and hatred of the enemy becomes more or less general, while those actually engaged in warfare may be guilty of atrocities which are utterly

incompatible with the humanitarian standards in accordance with which they themselves would ordinarily act.

The foregoing discussion has been a very brief analysis of the principal causes of the modern humanitarian movement. There has not been the space to mention many minor causes. But it must now be evident how important it is to understand the causes of this movement if practical measures are to be taken to further the movement. If the religious theory mentioned above is correct, the principal and perhaps the only measure to be taken is to preach religion. If the moral theory mentioned above is correct, the principal and perhaps the only measure to take is to deliver lectures on ethics. But if our theory is correct entirely or in the main, then to talk about peace will not prevent war and to tell the economic classes to love one another will not abolish industrial warfare. According to our theory the only effective measures in the long run will be those which direct the forces of industry, commerce, and science in such a fashion as to make the interests of individuals and of social groups as nearly alike as possible and the educational measures which will disseminate the kind of knowledge described above. And in this connection it is well to remember that many ideas which circulate as religious or as moral ideas or sometimes in both forms did not originate as such but came from science or arose out of the conditions which have been brought into being by economic and other changes. If the ideas are correct and will aid the progress of humanitarianism they may gain currency more easily under a religious or an ethical form. But the fundamental causes of humanitarianism must never be forgotten.

The modern humanitarian movement, we can now see, has arisen out of certain human traits influenced and directed by the conditions and ideas which have become prevalent during the last few centuries. Like every great movement it is a product of social evolution in general and can be understood only in the light of an analysis of social evolution. It is one phase of and an inevitable result from the universal world culture which is now rapidly coming into being. No unilateral theory can account for it.¹

¹ Many writers have presented unilateral theories to explain the modern humanitarian movement. As a very pronounced example of such a writer I might mention

The most spontaneous form of humanitarianism is that which grows directly out of the emotions. This is pure altruism and is perhaps not broad enough to be worthy of the name of humanitarianism. It arises in personal relations where the individual is moved by direct observation of the needs or the suffering of another to perform services for that other. It is pure "goodness of heart" untouched by any reflection as to the causes of the suffering or as to the consequences from the services rendered. It is evident that this form of humanitarianism is very limited in its range and is directed merely at the superficial appearance of the needs or suffering.

A less spontaneous form of humanitarianism is the sentimental type in which the altruistic tendencies become associated with ideas in such a fashion as to inhibit them in certain directions and to reinforce them in other directions so that they display a lack of proportion which sometimes becomes grotesque. This sentimental type may arise out of temperamental traits, ignorance, early training, circumstances of life, etc. Thus religious or moral ideas may

Benjamin Kidd. (See his *Social Evolution*, London, 1894.) This writer was at at one time very much in vogue, probably in the main because he catered so exclusively to the prejudices of the upper class and to religious sentiments. Kidd's central thesis is that altruism, self-sacrifice, humanitarianism, etc., are attributable to the "ultra-rational" sanction of religion. Indeed he carries his theory so far as to imply that society itself could not exist without this sanction. Religion, thus conceived as a social, integrating force, he contrasts with reason which he represents as an individualistic, disintegrating force. Throughout his discussion he displays a profound ignorance of modern psychology. His conception of the mental makeup of man seems to be that of certain of the older psychologists who conceived of man as a purely rational being who was always impelled to act from within by purely egoistic motives and must therefore be coerced from without to be altruistic. According to Kidd this coercion comes through religion.

Now it goes without saying that man is governed largely by egoistic considerations, and none but the anarchists believe that it will ever be possible to have a society without a certain amount of social control of the individual. But we have already noted what is well known to all who are familiar to modern psychology, namely, that man possesses certain instincts and feelings which impel him to do things for others and that altruism originates from within the man himself and not from without. Furthermore, this altruism is not to be distinguished from egoism as sharply as Kidd and similar writers are prone to do. As a general rule a mother is happier in caring for her child than in devoting herself exclusively to satisfying her own wants, and the normally sympathetic individual is happier in making at least a little personal sacrifice to relieve the suffering of his fellows than in devoting himself exclusively to satisfying his own wants.

lead the individual to inhibit altruistic tendencies toward those who are alleged to be immoral. An individual will be led, frequently quite unconsciously, by considerations of self-interest to exaggerated efforts in behalf of those with whom his interests are identified or are supposed to be identified, but will be blind to the needs of those whose interests are opposed or are supposed to be opposed to his interests. Various fortuitous circumstances may lead an individual to develop his altruistic tendencies in an extreme form along narrow lines to the exclusion of other forms of altruism.

Many examples of this sentimental type may be cited with all the inconsistencies and excesses which it includes. A manufacturer may contribute heavily to foreign missions, being moved to do so in part by altruistic motives, and yet overwork the men, women, and children in his factory. A clergyman may preach the duty of philanthropy to the poor and yet underpay the servant in his own household. An anarchist may agitate against capital punishment for murderers and yet kill innocent people with a bomb. A woman may make life miserable for the members of her family and yet work actively for the prevention of cruelty to animals. Various extreme forms of this sentimental type make their appearance, as, for example, when philozoism takes the form of vegetarianism or the still more extreme form of anti-vivisectionism.

The most highly evolved and the broadest form of humanitarianism is the intellectual type in which the altruistic impulses are directed and controlled by ideas. In this type an extended knowledge of mankind stimulates the sympathetic imagination to the highest degree, and every humanitarian measure is undertaken on the basis of a careful study of its ultimate effect upon the welfare of mankind. This is the least spontaneous type in the sense that the response to the altruistic impulses is not immediate, but these impulses may nevertheless be quite as strong in this type as in the others.

It goes without saying that no individual represents any one of these types perfectly. But humanity may be divided roughly into these three groups with respect to humanitarian traits. We all are acquainted with simple-minded, good-hearted persons who are helpful and kind to those within their own circle, but who know

little of and have no interest in the vast majority of mankind who do not come within their own personal experience. Their philanthropy is likely to take the form of personal almsgiving, and while they may succeed in aiding in the minor matters of life they are not likely to accomplish much with respect to the more important matters. It is obvious that these individuals represent the emotional humanitarian type. The sentimental type is abundantly represented in organized philanthropic movements, in religious circles, and in certain kinds of reform movements. The intellectual type is by far the rarest and is frequently hard to distinguish. He is found perhaps most frequently in social movements of the most fundamental sort. But he is also to be found in scientific, literary, artistic, educational, and other kinds of work where the relation of his work to the humanitarian movement and its influence upon that movement are not obvious at first sight. For example, it is interesting to note to what extent the humanitarian spirit of this highest type is now represented in science. In biology this is perhaps best illustrated by the development of eugenics. In the social sciences it is indicated by the great extent to which economics, which Carlyle, who was a sentimental humanitarian of his day, called the "dismal science," is concerning itself with problems of human welfare.

These types of humanitarianism may also be traced roughly through the many kinds of humanitarian activities. The emotional type is perhaps best represented by almsgiving. The sentimental type is represented in organized charitable work and in much of the reform work. The intellectual type is represented in certain far-reaching social movements and in many other kinds of activity where it is difficult to distinguish it. It is noticeable that the spirit of the first two types is what is ordinarily called philanthropic. In passing to the third type the spirit changes somewhat, and while it is still philanthropic in the sense that it is interested in human welfare it becomes rather what is ordinarily called a spirit of social justice. In this spirit the endeavor is made to benefit all of mankind and not to benefit one group in such a manner as to do injury to any other group.